Submitted to the Government of the Republic of Somaliland by

Davies Consulting GmbH

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D-8000 München 60

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4 February 1992  

© Davies Consulting GmbH

Table of Contents  

1  Executive Summary

After the end of the war of liberation, at the end of January 1991, the new Government of the Republic of Somaliland consolidated the militias of the liberation movements on its territory into a new military force for the new Republic.  It also partially demobilized this consolidated military force quickly from about 55,000 soldiers down to about 40,000 soldiers.  Since mid-Summer of 1991, the Government has wanted to demobilize by an additional 75%, down to about 10,000 soldiers, but has been unable to do so only because of the lack of the necessary funding.

Demobilizing military forces after a war of liberation is a complex task.  It requires careful planning and substantial financing in order to accomplish this important objective properly.

Demobilization in the Republic of Somaliland is complicated by the following factors:

• There is an overabundance of military weapons and munitions left over from the military forces of the former socialist dictatorship upon their defeat at the end of the war.  This includes both weapons in the hands of soldiers and weapons in the hands of civilians.

• Within the militias, it was normal that each soldier carries his own weapons and munitions with him at all times and depends upon voluntary donations of food from the civilian population for survival.

• In the first unorganized phase of demobilization, many middle-level officers and non-commissioned officers left military service and returned to their former professions and business activities -- leaving many teen-age soldiers with a broken chain-of-command and no communications with the leadership in the military forces.

• A large fraction of the remaining 40,000 soldiers are teen-age soldiers who missed their normal school education because of the war.  Since little progress has been made for reflating the economy, there are no opportunities for these untrained young men to survive economically if they were to voluntarily withdraw from military service.

• The Government has never had sufficient funds to be able to pay any of these soldiers cash as salaries for their services.  Sometimes, the Government has been able to provide them with free food.  Private citizens are suffering from the destruction of the infrastructure, a drought, and the lack of progress in reflating the economy.  Therefore, private citizens are less willing to provide unpaid soldiers with free food.

• These unpaid, heavily armed, and uncontrolled young soldiers are increasingly forced to use their weapons in order to acquire food for themselves to stay alive.  Practically all of the "armed skirmishes" over the past few months within the Republic have been due to hungry soldiers using their weapons to obtain food. (This "fighting" has not been due to conflicts between clans, as has been reported in the international press.)  This factor is creating a growing threat for both civil law-and-order as well as stability of the new democratic form of government.

• These armed and unpaid young soldiers will not voluntarily surrender their weapons and enter civilian status -- unless the Government provides them with real opportunities for economic survival.  If the Government were to succeed in disarming and demobilizing these soldiers with force, then international humanitarian organizations would have to feed and clothe them for many years before they could become self-sufficient by themselves.

• Many of the soldiers on active duty today, as well as former soldiers, are cripples, usually having lost at least one leg, arm, or eye.  They need medical treatment and rehabilitation before being discharged to look after themselves.  There are also many orphans of soldiers who died during the war of liberation.  There is a moral obligation to take care of these orphans.

This proposal presents a very pragmatic approach for solving the real problems in the real situation in the Republic of Somaliland today.  It is based upon defining appropriate new military concepts and new military missions for the peace-time military forces of the Republic and then developing a practical approach for converting the current armed forces, that were appropriate for the recent war of liberation, to the new armed forces, that will be appropriate for achieving peace-time missions.

A preliminary analysis of the expected threats and missions for the new military forces of the Republic led to the following preliminary conclusions:

1. The most serious external military threat to the Republic is posed by the former socialist dictator, Gen. Barre.  Continued military aid to Gen. Barre is assisting him to increase his military strength so that he can attempt to re-conquer both the former Italian Somaliland and the Republic of Somaliland -- and to re-establish his dictatorship.  The Republic of Somaliland must retain sufficient military capabilities to repulse any such attack by Gen. Barre and his military forces.  The recent embargo upon the import of weapons into this region by the Security Council of the United Nations could be helpful if it is successful in stopping the continued flow of military aid to Gen. Barre.  This would reduce both the risk of another war and the size of the military capabilities that the Republic of Somaliland will need to retain.

2. Continued inter-clan conflicts and fighting, particularly in the former Italian Somaliland, but also on a smaller scale in Eastern Ethiopia, pose a continued threat that these local conflicts could cross the border into the Republic of Somaliland.  (There have been no inter-clan conflicts and fighting in the Republic of Somaliland since its creation.)  Therefore, the new military forces must be able to contain such conflicts from crossing the border into the Republic.

3. Within the framework of regional cooperation, possibly along the model of the Economic Community of West Africa and their recent successful intervention to stop fighting in Liberia, the new military forces of the Republic of Somaliland could be called upon to cooperate with other military forces in stopping inter-clan fighting in either the former Italian Somaliland or Ethiopia.

4. Within the framework of international cooperation, the new military forces of the Republic of Somaliland could be called upon to cooperate in stopping regional conflicts, such as in Operation Desert Shield, or in international peace-keeping missions of the United Nations.  This capability could be particularly useful for the international community if the new military force is trained as a tri-lingual force (Somali, Arabic, and English).

Following are some of the key elements for implementing reasonable strategies for meeting these goals:

• The new military forces will be integrated into regional and international security organizations and peace-keeping forces.  They will present no threat to neighbors and will implement the strategy of the Government to become a responsible member of the regional and international communities.

• The missions of the new military forces will be focused away from enforcing the will of a central government upon the people, as under the former dictatorship, and towards defending the Republic from external aggression. The police forces now have the responsibility for maintaining civil law-and-order -- and the police are now decentralized and under the control of local governments.

• Demobilization of soldiers will take place after a start has been made in reflating the economy rather than before a start has been made.  While waiting for the international community to provide the first aid for reconstruction and reflating the economy, these soldiers will receive training for professions in civilian life and will work on reconstruction projects for the benefit of the country.  They will receive salaries while on active duty and a small package of loans or grants to enable them to become self-sufficient when they leave.

• In order to be complete and stabilizing in its effects, this proposal includes collecting about 200,000 weapons from civilians, recalling all weapons from soldiers and issuing them temporarily only as needed, collecting all larger weapons and military scrap, salvaging components as appropriate, maintaining all weapons and munitions properly while keeping them under control, and selling excess weapons, munitions, and scrap.

• This proposal suggests the creation of an appropriate military concept based upon a combination of a larger number of inactive-duty reserve forces and a smaller number of active-duty regular forces.  It includes appropriate training for both components, including training on non-lethal combat methods to provide more flexibility for future potential deployments.

It is also relevant to interpret this proposal for demobilization in the Republic of Somaliland within the framework of the recent embargo against the import of weapons into this region, imposed by the Security Council of the United Nations.  The stated purpose of this embargo is to stop the continued inter-clan fighting in the former Italian Somaliland.

The former Italian Somaliland, like the Republic of Somaliland, currently has an over abundance of weapons and munitions.  These weapons and munitions were provided by the international community as foreign and military aid to the former dictatorship of Gen. Barre.  The inter-clan fighting in the former Italian Somaliland, since the departure of Gen. Barre from Mogadishu, has been waged exclusively with these weapons that were provided to Gen. Barre before the end of the war of liberation.  Therefore, an embargo upon the import of new weapons into the former Italian Somaliland can have no direct effect upon the continued inter- clan fighting there.

At the end of the war of liberation, the leaders in the former British Somaliland returned effective political power to the citizens at the grass-roots level and achieved reconciliation among all clans residing in this territory.  They quickly established effective civil law-and-order, even without having a formal government, and established protection for the civil rights of individuals living among other clans than their own.  This provided the basis for the citizens, using decentralized democratic processes, to create their new Republic of Somaliland and the first Government of this Republic.  One of the effects of this process has been substantial progress towards demobilization and plans since this past Summer for substantial additional demobilization -- that has only been blocked by a lack of funding and has been independent of international resolutions.

At the end of the war of liberation, a very few leaders in the former Italian Somaliland quickly created a new "interim government" with an "interim president" -- without first decentralizing real political power or attempting reconciliation.  The inevitable result was an intense struggle for power over this new dictatorship with its very narrow base of power and almost total lack of support by the citizens.  Without reconciliation, it is not practical to expect that the militias of the different liberation movements and clans would voluntarily demobilize -- while they are still fighting each other for political power.

The international community bears a heavy responsibility for the continued fighting in the former Italian Somaliland, due to their negative external influence on this situation.  The first policy of the international community was to deny recognition and foreign aid, other than emergency humanitarian aid, to the Republic of Somaliland.  The stated goal was to force the citizens of the Republic of Somaliland to give up their hard-won new decentralized democracy in favor of subjugating themselves to the new dictatorship in Mogadishu.  By punishing the new democracy and free-market economy in the Republic of Somaliland while supporting the new dictatorship in the former Italian Somaliland, the international community deliberately supported the unstable post-war model in the South, rather than the stable post-war model in the North.

The best opportunity for the international community to promote peace in the former Italian Somaliland today consists of reversing its policy -- by starting to support the successful post-war model in the Republic of Somaliland, as a positive example for the former Italian Somaliland to follow.  Financial support for this proposal, to actually implement the demobilization that the Republic of Somaliland has tried to implement alone for the past half year, would underline the desirability for the former Italian to follow this model as well.  If the international community were to quickly also provide sufficient economic aid, beyond pure humanitarian aid, to make the economy in the Republic of Somaliland recover, this would add another powerful incentive for the individual clans in the former Italian Somaliland to adopt the same successful model themselves.

The officials of UN organizations working on the scene in the Horn of Africa have gradually come to the same conclusion.  They are limited by their own semantic rules that force them to always treat the dissolving "interim dictatorship" in Mogadishu as being the only government for the whole of the former Democratic Republic of Somalia and forbidding them to even mention the existence of the democratic Republic of Somaliland or its Government.  Within these semantic limitations, they concluded "It is hoped that the implementation of relief and rehabilitation programs in the north will act as an incentive to the opposing factions in the central and southern regions of the country to bring about conditions permitting a similar 'reprise' of such activities in the areas they control." (page 60 of the "Situation Report" of SEPHA on 1 October 1991)  Indirectly, this report also admits that the "interim government" in Mogadishu does not even rule over the former Italian Somaliland -- since the actual control over this territory is by "opposing factions".

Any serious approach to demobilization, using modern management methods, must start with the development of strategic military concepts, military missions, and plans for their implementation.  Due to the lack of funding for the Government, it has not yet been able to start such strategic military planning, which must be the basis for a professional and systematic approach towards demobilization.

This proposal for a demobilization project presents only a preliminary outline for a strategic military concept.  It then estimates the costs for implementing this preliminary strategic military concept.  The objective here is primarily to obtain a first estimate of how much it will cost to demobilize properly.  Substantial strategic planning and more detailed planning for implementation will be necessary before a detailed budget can be developed.

The short-term goal of this project proposal is to obtain sufficient funding to immediately start

• strategic planning in more detail and

• implementation of this concept

in parallel.  Although preliminary, this project proposal is already in sufficient detail to allow an immediate start in its implementation, with possibilities for modification to meet the evolving strategic concepts as demobilization progresses.

2  A Strategic Concept for the New Military

Demobilization is only one component of transforming

• the military forces that were appropriate for fighting a war of liberation into

• the military forces that will be appropriate for the new democratic Republic.

One difference between these two concepts consists of the excess military personnel that will be demobilized.  This implies the need for

• taking an inventory of what the Republic has now,

• determining what the Republic should keep, and

• defining the excess capacity that the Republic should demobilize.

Therefore, we need to determine what should be kept as a pre-requisite for determining what we want to demobilize.

A reasonable strategic concept should contain at least the following components:

• defining a new set of missions for the new military force,

• defining goals of regional cooperation and integration,

• defining goals of international cooperation and integration, and

• defining a structure for the new military force to meet its new missions.

2.1  Defining New Missions

The old mission was relatively simple, consisting of deposing the oppressive socialist dictatorship of Gen. Barre.  It was implemented within the framework of the old dictatorship, where the primary mission of the military of the dictatorship was to suppress popular dissent to the policies of the dictatorship.

An important aspect of defining new missions for the new military forces of the Republic will consist of orientating it away from suppressing internal dissent and towards providing protection from external aggression.  A very sensitive aspect will consist of defining whether and under what conditions this new military should be used to suppress potential conflicts among clans, both in the Republic and in neighboring countries, under regional peace-keeping missions.

2.2  Defining Regional Cooperation and Integration

Due to the very similar military and political situations in Ethiopia and Eritrea, there are very interesting opportunities for regional cooperation and integration, perhaps along the model of NATO.  Such cooperation could lead to a reduction of tensions, that could lead to a corresponding reduction in the strength of military forces required in each of these countries.  However, it could also lead to regional requirements for contributions to regional peace-keeping forces, such as in the Economic Community of West Africa.  Such regional cooperation could be extended to Djibouti immediately and to the former Italian Somaliland later -- when it succeeds in achieving internal peace and reconciliation.

Continued fighting in the former Italian Somaliland and in Eastern Ethiopia demonstrate the dangerous internal conflicts in these two neighbor states, that have a potential for spilling over into the Republic of Somaliland.  Also, the former socialist dictator, Gen. Barre, still exists with a powerful and well-financed military in his enclave within the former Italian Somaliland -- along the border with Ethiopia.  It appears likely that he would attack the Republic of Somaliland if he succeeds in retaking the former Italian Somaliland.  A regional peace-keeping force could potentially play a constructive role in stopping the continued fighting in the South of the Sudan, like a regional peace-keeping force of the Economic Community of West Africa stopped the fighting in Liberia.  In summary, there are several problems unique to this region for which regional organizations could develop regional policies for solving.  The new military forces of the Republic of Somaliland may be called upon to share in such regional responsibilities in the near future.

2.3  Defining International Cooperation

Within the larger surrounding region, the recent Gulf War demonstrated the need for stationing multi-national military forces and logistical supplies in this region, both on the Arabian Peninsula and in strategic backup positions.  As one example, the flying distance for strategic bombers from Hargeisa to Iraq is approximately half the distance as from Diego Garcia to Iraq.  This implies that strategic bombers stationed or deployed from Hargeisa could potentially fly twice as many sorties per day as from Diego Garcia.  There are several interesting possibilities for international cooperation involving the stationing of other military forces, or at least logistical supplies, at the port of Berbera and the airport of Hargeisa.  They could also include integration of parts of the new military within international military forces and peace-keeping forces, such as those of the United Nations.  Such cooperation could demonstrate that the new Republic of Somaliland is willing to play a responsible role within the international community.

2.4  Defining a Structure for the New Military

Once the missions for the new military forces have been defined, it will be possible and necessary to define the structure for the new military that will be necessary to achieve these missions.  The definition of this structure will involve at least the following components:

• the structure of different services,

• the structure of human resources, and

• the structure of equipment resources.

2.4.1  The Structure of Different Services

Conventionally, the structure of different services involves the choice of which services are relevant and the relative allocation of resources to them for their sub-missions.

The current structure of the military forces consists almost entirely of a typical liberation army, i.e. lightly-armed ground forces.  One immediate question is whether relatively higher emphasis should be placed upon developing

• an army,

• a navy,

• a coast guard, and/or

• an air force.

As only one relatively simple example, the Republic has a relatively long coastline with very rich supplies of fish and other seafood.  It is quite likely that the Republic will want to quickly develop a strategy for licensing and controlling the currently uncontrolled fishing by international fishing fleets within its territorial waters.  Such a strategy is very appropriate for obtaining legitimate revenues from this important resource, preventing over fishing and pollution in its territorial waters, and to expand its own capabilities for fishing and processing seafood. 

It will be impossible to sell fishing licenses, control over-fishing, and prevent pollution as long as international fleets can fish and pollute as they like with no control.  The quick creation of an effective Coast Guard will be an important pre-requisite for being able to implement such strategies quickly and to receive the income from licenses that the Republic needs so desperately.  There is an interesting precedent from 1991 in Sierra Leone on the Coast of West Africa, where the Government there formed a joint venture with a small British marine company to operate a small privately-owned coast guard -- that quickly brought much more in revenues from fishing licenses than the operational costs for this coast guard.

This small example shows that it may be appropriate for the Republic to place a higher priority upon a Coast Guard relative to the priority of maintaining a large active-duty Army.

2.4.2  The Structure of Human Resources

Based upon the nature of the mission, and the mixture of short-term and long-term threats defined in this mission, the Republic will need to decide upon the ratio of active military forces and reserve military forces.  It will also need to decide upon the levels of equipment and training that will be appropriate for both active and reserve components.  Once this ratio has been determined, it would be very appropriate for the Republic to provide limited retraining of current military personnel for new roles as reserve military personnel -- before demobilizing them.

The Republic will need to define a hierarchical structure for both active and reserve military personnel, such as the division between officers and enlisted men (and possibly women).  As one example, it may be appropriate to retain a relatively large fraction of officers on active duty, to allow the quick mobilization of enlisted men to serve under these officers during emergencies.  All of these personnel will require appropriate training to meet the missions and threats defined for them.

As one small example, current military personnel can only respond to threats by shooting at their opponents.  It would be very appropriate, and relatively inexpensive, to teach these personnel alternative non-lethal combat methods, to provide a spectrum of appropriate responses to conflict situations.  This would involve a relatively inexpensive program of bringing in specialists to teach the local military teachers, who would then teach their comrades.  This could be an important component of peacetime activities for maintaining physical fitness and morale.

2.4.3  The Structure of Equipment Resources

The military forces of the Republic captured large quantities of military equipment and munitions from the armed forces of the former dictatorship during and at the end of the war of liberation.  There is also a large amount of inoperable military equipment, vehicles, etc. lying around and rusting.

It will be very appropriate to collect, store, maintain, and make an inventory of this military equipment and munitions.  In parallel, it will be appropriate to determine the requirements of military equipment and munitions for the new missions of the new military.  A comparison between what is available and what is needed will define a specific list of surpluses and deficits.  It should be possible to either sell or trade surpluses for either cash or equipment and munitions that are in deficit.  The goal would be to practically eliminate any short-term requirements for buying additional weapons or munitions for the next few years.

One result of such a systematic approach would be the fact that very few military personnel need to have weapons issued to them permanently.  This could lead to a recall of nearly all military weapons for storage and maintenance, so that they could be issued quickly when any real needs occur.  This could play an important role in preventing abuses of weapons by military personnel.  Much of this military equipment, weapons, and munitions will deteriorate or get lost very quickly if it is not stored properly and maintained properly.

The acquisition of new equipment in the short-term should be limited to the acquisition of transport vehicles for collecting military equipment, weapons, and junk as well as for telecommunications equipment to strengthen the communications and control within the military forces.  In parallel, this will include renovation of existing buildings in order to provide proper storage and maintenance facilities, plus living quarters for military personnel.

3  Strategic Plans for Implementation

Once the overall strategic concepts are available, as goals, it will be necessary to develop detailed plans for implementing these concepts.  These plans could be broken down into the following categories:

• creating a new and smaller military force,

• demobilizing the excess capacity of personnel,

• recycling large supplies of equipment and materials,

• construction, and

• meeting residual obligations.

3.1  Creating a New and Smaller Military Force

These plans will implement the conversion from the current military force to the military force required.  This will include the aspects of training, equipment, supplies, bases, housing, transportation, communications, medical services, etc.  It will also include planning for how to recall reserve forces, how to train and equip reserve forces, and how to quickly integrate recalled reserve forces within the active military forces.

3.2  Demobilizing Excess Capacity

These plans will include selection of personnel for demobilization, timing for their releases, recalling all weapons and munitions before they are released, providing appropriate training for both reserve roles and civilian occupations, etc.  Demobilization of all excess personnel at one time would place an extra burden upon the already weak economy, that has not yet had a chance to start reflating itself.  Therefore, it will be appropriate to phase the release of military personnel to civilian status over several months.  This will use excess military capacity for a variety of military peacetime reconstruction activities as well as civil reconstruction projects.  Even though charged to the project for "demobilization", the temporary salaries for these military personnel, until they are discharged, will provide a major and badly-needed stimulus for reflating the economy.

It will also be appropriate to consider financial support in the form of loans and/or grants to assist discharged personnel in quickly establishing civilian economic activities.  In this region, most civilian citizens are essentially all small private entrepreneurs, rather than employees.  Therefore, these people will need seed capital for starting or restarting small private enterprises, rather than new jobs.  Economically, this means that there is little requirement for large amounts of capital for starting large companies to create a large number of new jobs.  Rather there is an immediate requirement for a large number of small capital investments for starting a large number of small enterprises.  These small enterprises may consist of becoming a nomad, a farmer, a craftsman, a merchant, etc.  Fortunately, it is much easier and less expensive to make a large number of such small enterprises quickly self sufficient than to make a few large companies profitable with a large number of secure jobs.

Even though this important aspect of reflating the economy and establishing self-sufficiency for a large number of citizens will be included as a one-time component within this project for demobilization of the military, it will be focused upon reflating the economy and establishing self sufficiency, rather than creating new military capabilities.  For optimal management and control, this important function must be budgeted and managed within the project for demobilizing these people, in order to integrate timing, training, and provision of seed capital -- in order to make this operation successful.

3.3  Recycling Military Equipment and Materials

These plans will detail how usable military equipment and materials will be collected, stored, maintained, and accounted for.  They will also detail how unusable military equipment will be collected, usable components will be salvaged, and the scrap will be sold or disposed.  They will include the aspects of personnel, transport equipment, storage facilities, maintenance equipment and supplies, accounting systems, etc. for implementing this sub-project.

3.4  Construction

Since over 70% of all buildings have been destroyed in the Republic of Somaliland, it will be necessary to reconstruct many badly-damaged buildings and to build new buildings to meet the requirements of the new military force.  Since the new military force will have only a small fraction of the size of the military forces of the former dictatorship that were stationed in the Republic, it should be possible to take over the old military bases of the dictatorship and to renovate sufficient buildings to meet most of the requirements of the new military forces of the Republic.

These buildings will include offices, training facilities, storage facilities, maintenance facilities, housing facilities, and medical facilities.

3.5  Meeting Residual Obligations

The military has immediate residual obligations for

• providing rehabilitation for handicapped individuals, such as those who lost arms and legs while serving on active duty, and

• taking care of orphans whose parents died while serving on active duty.

In the first category, there are approximately 5,000 handicapped personnel still on active duty and an unknown number of personnel no longer on active duty.  The handicapped personnel on active duty should receive special rehabilitation, including artificial limbs and training on how to use them, as well as vocational training.  In most cases, they will be discharged from military service, but must be given either opportunities to survive economically or at least receive disability pensions upon which they can survive.

In the second category, there are approximately 4,000 mothers who are caring for orphans and need a small subsidy to pay for their living costs.

Over a longer period of time, the Republic may want to honor and compensate its veterans of the war of liberation in various ways.  Therefore, it will be important to document who served and how.  This will involve retroactively creating written records of service for all current and former military personnel.  It will also include issuing plastic ID cards with photographs to identify

• all current active-duty personnel,

• all current reserve-duty personnel, and

• all inactive veterans.

4  The Human Resources

Following are our preliminary rough estimates for the numbers of personnel involved in this project of demobilization:

The total military forces of the Republic of Somalia were less than 10,000 before Gen. Barre began his military build-up.  Therefore, it appears to be reasonable to set a goal of creating a new military force with less than 10,000 men for the Republic of Somaliland, representing about 1/3 of the territory of the former Republic of Somalia.

These estimates will need to be refined, based upon the development of the new strategic plans and local investigation, before accurate budgets can be prepared based upon using these numbers.  The estimates of 55,000 soldiers at the end of the war and 40,000 soldiers since mid-Summer 1991 are very rough estimates.  The estimate for the difference, i.e. 15,000 demobilized soldiers, is more accurate.  Due to the lack of funding, it will not be possible to obtain more-accurate estimates until this project proposal is funded.  One of the first activities will consist of issuing ID cards to all military personnel.  However, these preliminary estimates do appear to be reasonable for generating adequate estimates for budgeting purposes.

5  Training

The following categories of training appear to be appropriate for this project:

• reading and writing

• general physical training

• general military discipline

• non-lethal combat methods

• military vocational training

• non-military vocational training

Different packages of training will be appropriate for personnel who will

• stay on active duty,

• join the reserves, or

• retire.

In developing a concept for training, it will be important to remember that a very large fraction of the current military force consists of teen-agers who missed the opportunity to obtain secondary education -- due to the breakdown of the educational system during the war of liberation.  It will be important to teach all of these personnel to read and write, if they do not already have this capability, before continuing on active duty or returning to civilian life.  This could also contain a summary of information that they missed, such as concerning history, mathematics, etc.  It could also be useful to teach at least some of the personnel one foreign language, such as English.

Most of these personnel have been underfed for an extended period of time.  They will need adequate feeding for a few months before they will overcome the physical effects of malnutrition.  It will be important to include physical training and sports during this period, to enable their bodies to become fully functional again.

The militias of liberation movements are relatively informal organizations, driven by the common high-level of motivation to remove the oppressive dictator.  It will be important to train all of these personnel who remain on active duty or go onto reserve duty in more conventional aspects of military discipline and order.  This will include a clear definition of their matching authority and responsibility under the new Constitution and civilian leadership over the military forces.

Particularly if the new military forces will receive missions involving restoring civil order in civil conflicts among clans, as currently existing in the former Italian Somaliland and Eastern Ethiopia, it will be necessary to train the personnel to use non-lethal methods of combat.  This usually involves Oriental martial arts, using hands, sticks, and knives.  It is low-cost training that provides military forces with more flexible options for applying force to stop aggressors, without needing to resort to the use of firearms in each case.

It will be necessary to provide vocational training for the skills required by the military itself, such as for clerks, drivers, car mechanics, electricians, telecommunications, etc. -- that are also useful for civilian life.  This will also include some training that is less relevant for civilian life, such as combat methods, handling firearms, etc.

It will also be necessary to provide vocational training for personnel being demobilized, so that they will be able to become self-sufficient as civilians.  This includes some vocations that are also relevant for the military, but also other vocations that are not relevant for the military, such as farming, managing cattle, fishing, etc.

Planning for training should consider the fact that there are currently a large number of qualified but unemployed teachers in the Republic.  Funding is not yet available for reconstructing schools, developing new curricula, writing and printing textbooks and other educational materials, etc. in order to restart the educational system.  Simpler training for the military could be started quicker, before the educational system can be restarted, and therefore provides a useful opportunity to employ these teachers and to give them diversified experience in "adult education" before they return to the normal educational system.  Some educational materials will need to be written and printed, but this will be a much simpler task than for restarting the whole primary and secondary educational system.  (Most of this training and the training materials will need to be in the Somali language.)

The military academy in Harer, across the border in Ethiopia, was known as being one of the best military academies in Africa.  Within a framework of regional cooperation, it could be useful for military officers from both the Republic of Somaliland and Eritrea to visit this academy for training.  This academy was closed during the recent civil war in Ethiopia, but we are considering possibilities for re-opening it -- within a framework of regional cooperation on security.  This could indirectly serve toward reducing military tensions in the region, such as due to the resulting personal contacts between military officers of these 3 countries.  This would also be much more cost-effective than for each of these 3 countries to develop their own independent military academies.

6  Demobilization of Personnel

Planning for the demobilization of personnel will include the following aspects:

• collecting weapons

• training for

  • civilian vocations and

  • reserve functions

• temporary use of personnel on

  • military reconstruction projects and

  • civilian reconstruction projects

• stimulating the general economy recovery with their salaries,

• preventing an economic shock of too many people entering the civilian work force at the same time, and

• seed capital for achieving self sufficiency.

Nearly all military personnel have their own weapons and ammunition that they carry with them and/or store at their homes.  These weapons and ammunition are not maintained properly and represent a serious threat for uncontrolled use.  This project will give these military personnel salaries for the first time.  One condition for receiving these salaries will be that they will be required to turn in all weapons and ammunition that they may have.  These weapons and ammunition will be stored and maintained properly.  They will be reissued quickly whenever there is a real need for these personnel to have them.  At the moment, there is no need for these personnel to be carrying weapons, except for official military training.

Personnel being demobilized will need to receive appropriate training for their new civilian vocations.  This will include a summary of the training that they missed by missing secondary education during the war of liberation.  It will also include appropriate training for their reserve functions if they transfer to a reserve status.

The military itself has a vast immediate need for renovating buildings and repairing equipment.  It would be appropriate to use personnel about to be demobilized for performing this work.  This could include appropriate training, particularly since nearly identical skills will be needed for several years of reconstruction and repair within the civilian sector.

There is also a vast immediate need for renovating buildings, repairing equipment, repairing roads and bridges, etc. in the public sector.  Rather than to create a new permanent bureaucracy in the Government for organizing, managing, and performing this work, it may be more cost effective to use the existing military structures to perform much of this work as a civil-works project by the military.  This approach does have the disadvantage that it may be psychologically easier to obtain foreign financing for purely civilian projects than for essentially civilian projects performed by military personnel in the process of being demobilized.

The war of liberation not only destroyed most of the infrastructure in the Republic, but also brought most of the economy to a standstill.  Salaries paid to citizens for reconstruction work, whether as military personnel or civilian workers, will play a very important role in stimulating a recovery of the whole economic system.  These salaries will allow the recipients to buy goods, which will allow merchants to buy and resell these goods, will allow transporters to transport these goods, and will allow suppliers to produce or manufacture these goods.  Since these military personnel are already employees of the Government, even though the Government has been unable to pay any salaries to them, it is easier and faster to pump money into the economy through existing employees than to first create new organizations, hire and train new employees, provide management for these new organizations, etc.

Approximately 50% of the population are still either refugees outside of the Republic or displaced persons within the Republic.  All of these people have no sources of income other than charitable donations, primarily from the nomads but also some aid from international organizations.  Quickly demobilizing military personnel in this situation would cause even more frustration and needs for humanitarian assistance to keep these people and their families alive.  Therefore, it will be important to demobilize these personnel gradually over several months and to provide assistance so that they can quickly become self-sufficient, rather than to immediately become dependent upon foreign humanitarian aid.

Since most of the demobilized personnel will want to establish small private enterprises of their own, they will need at least small amounts of seed capital to get started.  To become a nomad, they will need to buy at least a few animals.  To become a farmer, they will need to buy seeds and tools, as well as to be able to survive until they can harvest their first crop.  To become a craftsman, they will need tools and raw materials.  Since most of these personnel have received no cash salaries for several years, only food and occasional clothing to stay alive, they will not have even the small amounts of seed capital that they will need to get started.  Giving these personnel small cash salaries for a few months before discharging them, instead of discharging them without having received any cash salaries, will give them the opportunity to save small amounts of cash.  An additional program of loans or grants for demobilized military personnel will be appropriate for assisting them in making this critical transition to self sufficiency.

7  A Preliminary Budget for Demobilization

This budget is broken down into two components

• a one-time budget that covers all operating expenses of the military for a 6-month period while demobilizing and

• a continuous budget for normal operating expenses every 6 months after the first 6-month demobilization period.

Substantial work on developing strategic concepts as well as developing detailed plans for implementing these concepts will be necessary before it will be possible to create detailed budgets.

We suggest that the budget estimates here are sufficiently accurate for planning purposes.  Due to the extreme urgency of starting as quickly as possible, partially due to the expected deterioration of internal security and civil order before the Government can start providing salaries for its military personnel, we recommend authorizing a total of about 220 million DM for the first 6-month period and simply limiting all expenditures within this period to this budget.  During this period, it will be possible to develop more detailed budgets for continued operations over the next few 6-month periods.  The Government should be able to assume all normal operating costs of this military within about 3 years of the start of this project.  This projection depends heavily upon the amount of financial aid that will be available in this time for other projects focused upon reconstruction of the shattered infrastructure and reflating the economy -- and hence the tax base.

There may be some special opportunities to save on costs, by obtaining donations of surplus military transportation and construction equipment from US military units that are leaving Europe and the Middle East.

7.1  The One-Time Component (The First 6 Months)

This budget includes both

• the one-time costs for demobilizing approximately 75% of the existing military force and

• the normal operational costs for the residual 25% of the military force during this first 6-month period.  

7.2  Normal Budget for Each Following 6 Months