The liberation movements of Somalia evolved originally as spontaneous reactions to the oppressive socialist dictatorship of General Mohamed Siad Barre. Partially due to the traditional Somali society and partially due to the tremendous logistical problems of communications and movement during the dictatorship, a number of different and quite independent liberation movements evolved – all with the same general goals, but most based primarily upon local clan affiliations.

After the defeat of General Mohamed Siad Barre and his dictatorship in January 1991, there was ostensibly no need for "liberation movements", since they had already succeeded in their goal of "liberating" Somalia from the dictatorship of General Barre. These "liberation movements" should convert into political parties, rather than primarily militias, and be working constructively in recreating a new post-Barre Somalia. This constructive phase has only worked more-or-less in what is now the Republic of Somaliland. Otherwise, the liberation movements that fought the war-of-liberation in the former Italian Somali have often split into 2 warring factions and new "liberation movements" or "factions" have surfaced – to share the "spoils of war".

With the proliferation of "liberation movements" or "factions", the Somalis themselves are trying to distinguish between

• "genuine" liberation movements that formed before January 1991 and actually fought against the socialist dictatorship of General Barre during the war-of-liberation versus 

• "new" liberation movements that formed after the country was already liberated from the dictatorship.

Any two Somalis can get together and form a new "liberation movement" that claims to represent any group of people they want to claim. International "reconciliation conferences" that give one vote to each faction admitted use almost non-existent "liberation movements" in order to deliberately distort voting rights at these conferences. This practice began at the two Djibouti Conferences in the Summer of 1991. More recently, the US State Department and the United Nations in particular have been using this technique to inflate the importance of minor liberation groups that support their own stated goals, in order to weaken the influence of genuine liberation movements that oppose some of their views, particularly concerning recognition of the Republic of Somaliland. Therefore, Somalis are beginning to argue that only "genuine" liberation movements who fought against the dictatorship prior to January 1991 should be admitted as real factions to such "reconciliation conferences".

In the first category of "genuine" liberation movements, we include:

• the SSDF (Somali Salvation Democratic Front);
• the SNM (Somali National Movement) and the SSNM (Southern Somali National Movement) that later split off from the SNM;
• the SPM (Somali Patriotic Movement) and the two factions that it split into:
• the SPM (Ogadeni) and
• the SPM (Harti);
• the USC (United Somali Congress) and the two factions that it split into:
• the USC ('Aidid') and
• the USC (Mahdi); and
• the SDM (Somali Democratic Movement) and the two factions that it split into:
• the SDM (pro 'Aidid') and
• the SDM (pro Mahdi).

In the second category, we include:

• the SNF (Somali National Front);
• the SDA (Somali Democratic Alliance) and the "new SDA" that appeared later;
• the USP (United Somali Party) and the "new USP" that appeared later;
• the USF (United Somali Front) and the "new USF" that appeared later;
• the SAMO (Somali Africans Muke Organization);
• the SNDU (Somali National Democratic Union); and
• the SNU (Somali National Union),

In Figure 4.1, there is a table showing which of these "factions" or "liberation movements"

• were represented at the Djibouti Conferences in the Summer of 1991,
• were represented at the UN Conferences in Addis Ababa in January and March of 1993,
• are anti-Barre or pro-Barre (or have switched loyalties),
• have a militia today, and
• control territory and people today.

[This figure will be added later.]

Perhaps even more important for voting rights at any conferences for reconciliation and creating new governments, only factions that represent a significant number of citizens eligible for voting should be seated. Unfortunately, this most-important criterion was not even considered in choices of which "faction" to seat and which "faction" not to seat at either the Djibouti Conferences or the UN Conferences in Addis Ababa. Therefore, it is not easy for an outsider to guess which factions would qualify, since none have ever been formally tested on this most-important criterion.

Testing individual factions for this criterion is difficult for the following reasons:

• Some factions have held traditional Congresses at which delegates selected their senior leadership, using democratic elections by the delegates at these Congresses and where the delegates were selected democratically by traditional methods or elections as representatives of large numbers of citizens in their "constituencies". In these almost ideal cases, most, but not all, of the members of the group of citizens that the faction claims to represent have given a legitimate mandate to these factions to represent them. This is certainly the case for the SNM and appears to be the case for the SSNM and the USC ('Aidid').
• Some factions have held traditional Congresses with delegates that represent only a very small fraction of the people that these factions claim to represent. This is the case of the USC (Mahdi) and their "interim government" – with some reservations. The formation of the "interim government" was by a subset of the Manifesto Group, whereby the original Manifesto Group had 114 members, and none of these 114 members were selected as representatives of any constituencies. Rather, the Manifesto Group was a "club" of individual prominent national politicians and local businessmen from Mogadishu who joined together because of common views, like a local chapter of a Chamber-of-Commerce. Not having mandates from any other citizens to do anything for them, this means that about 100 citizens acting by themselves created the "interim government" that claimed sovereignty over all of the former Republic of Somalia. Later small Congresses did have representatives from a few clans and thereby did give a larger mandate to the "interim government", but this mandate was never anywhere near the total Somali people that this "interim government" claimed.
• Some factions have held a traditional Congress with delegates that represented the majority of the people that they claim to represent, but have radically changed their leadership and political direction afterwards, without calling any true representative Congresses to confirm their new leaderships and political directions, with a genuine mandate from the people they claim to represent. This appears to be the case for the SSDF.
• Some factions claim to represent only small numbers of citizens in small minority groups. Therefore, they have a valid claim for being heard at such Conferences, but one might question whether very small legitimate factions should have equal voting powers as very large legitimate factions. This appears to be the case for the SAMO and SNU.
• Some factions appear to consist of very small "clubs" of private individuals with similar political views who then claim to represent large numbers of people, without ever having called a Congress of their alleged constituencies or having received a mandate from these alleged constituencies to represent them. This appears to be the case for the SNF, new SDA, new USP, new USF, and SNDU above. In these extreme cases, small groups of perhaps 100 individuals of much less have been able, with no valid mandates from any additional citizens, been able to obtain equal voting rights at the UN Conferences in Addis Ababa as factions with valid mandates from over 1 million citizens -- and the SNM, with a valid mandate from nearly 1 million eligible voters has been excluded from these Conferences.

The original SPM faction started out as an active anti-Barre liberation movement, that switched to being a lukewarm supporter of General Barre as a result of its opposition to the unilateral declaration of the self-proclaimed "interim government" of Mr. Ali Madhi and subsequent attacks against the SPM by the supporters of the "interim government". Later, it split into anti- and pro-Barre subfactions and militias.

The original SDA supported General Barre during the war-of-liberation, but reconciled with the SNM and other factions and clans in the North to form the Republic of Somliland and is now an anti-Barre faction.

The relationships between the international community and these "factions" has played a significant role in blocking peace and democracy in Somalia in two different ways:

• the issue of recognition for the Republic of Somaliland and
• sacrificing progress towards democracy and peace to satisfy demands of those blocking democracy and peace.

One set of political problems associated with recognition for the Republic of Somaliland combined with efforts to block democracy and recognition for the Republic of Somaliland, that indirectly blocked peace in Somalia is as follows:

The second set of problems is that the UN gives heavily biased treatment and voting power to small groups of Somalis who have powerful militias that are actually fighting each other over larger groups of Somalis who are behaving peacefully and responsibly. The UN consistently punishes those Somalis who have behaved responsibility in working towards peace and democracy, in order not to offend the "war lords" who are blocking peace and democracy in Somalia.

We note in this context that the Guurti Conference of the Elders in Borama, that started on 4 February 1993, has about 700 delegates who proportionately represent ALL clans and subclans living in the Republic of Somaliland. It is effectively their democratic parliament. All of these clans and subclans chose their delegates using basically democratic traditional procedures. We note that approximately 9% of these delegates are women, who have equal rights as male delegates at this Conference. Although activists for women's rights may complain that this is still not 50%, it is already as high as in the parliaments of many Western Democracies and this is a surprising result for a predominantly Islamic country.

The non-Issaq clans and subclans are participating 100% in the Conference at Borama with the delegates that they selected democratically to represent them. These democratically-selected delegates are unanimously in favor of independence for the Republic of Somaliland and are cooperating fully and enthusiastically in resolving all outstanding problems of the Republic of Somaliland. These delegates from non-Isaq clans and subclans admit that some individuals in their constituencies are opposed to independence of the RSL, but they are supporting the interests of the vast majorities in their constituencies that favor independence.

How can the US State Department and the United Nations claim that they are trying to promote peace and democracy in Somalia – and continue to suppress and ignore such a massive demonstration of democracy and cooperation for peace as demonstrated at the Borama Conference? The Somalis would like to challenge the US State Department and the United Nations to publish a list of the members of the new SDA, new USP, and new USF factions that they prefer to support over the elected government of the Republic of Somaliland and to publish the number of citizens in the RSL who support these small new factions – that are largely unknown within the RSL itself. If the US State Department and the United Nations were actually willing to put the facts on the table, they would be exposed in their behavior that continues to block peace and democracy in Somalia today.

Is this merely a case of unprofessional wishful thinking, i.e. defining a "politically-correct view" and then accepting only information that supports the politically-correct view while ignoring or rejecting all information that challenges the official view? Is there any responsibility or accountability for the damage that such unprofessional behavior causes?

Following is a summary description of the current "liberation movements" or "factions" in Somalia:

General Mohamed Abshir Musa, Chairman

The SSDF is comprised mainly of members of the Majerteen clan of the Darod group of clans. It was the first resistance movement to oppose the rule of General Barre in the late 1970's. It developed around an unsuccessful coup attempt by Majerteen officers on 9 April 1978. This coup was led by Colonel Mohamoud Sheekh Osman ('Irro'). A total of 17 officers were arrested and received death, life imprisonment, or other long terms of imprisonment.

The SSF was not able to continue with its primary mission, of attacks across the border in Somalia against the Dictatorship, until it received substantial financial and military aid from Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi of Libya. The condition for this new support was that they had to adopt the "Green Book" of Colonel Qaddafi.

Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed was now able to lead guerrilla attacks across the border from Ethiopia into Somalia against the Government. General Barre responded with massive retribution against innocent Majerteen citizens and destroying whole villages based only upon the suspicion that they might be supporters of the SSF. The Majerteen General Mohamed Saeed Hirsi ('Morgan') proved his loyalty to General Barre in directing these atrocities against his own Majerteen people. This included some of the first examples of General Barre's officers encouraging their soldiers to rape innocent Majerteen women as a form of punishment for the Majerteen clan.

As the original SSF leadership saw their position weakening, they worked a deal with the Ethiopian and Libyan Governments to "surrender" to the Ethiopian Government. Then the Ethioipian Government was able to crush the remaining left-oriented faction of the SSDF. The Ethiopian Government was also able to make raids into Somalia, labeling them as SSDF raids.

By 1985, the SSDF had stopped almost all military actions, particularly in Somalia. Most of the leading leaders switched sides and joined with General Mohamed Siad Barre, under his offers of reconciliation to bring all Darods together under his command. General Barre also used strong economic incentives, such as using funds from Italy for construction projects in the Region of the Majerteens in order to paralyze their SSDF. Therefore, the SSDF remained neutral throughout most of the war-of-liberation.

Colonel Mengistu arrested Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed and several of his key aides and held them in jail until the end of Colonel Mengistu's regime, i.e. from 1984/85 until 1991. An Ethiopian from Dire Dawa, Musse Islam, claimed to be the new head of the SSDF for several years. Upon his release from prison in 1991, General Abdullahi Yusuf resumed his role of leadership of the SSDF.

Even though the SSDF did not provide any official military resistance to the dictatorship of General Barre during the last years of the war-of-liberation, many individuals, who had belonged to the SSDF earlier, did continue with individual acts against the dictatorship.

After January 1991

Since the end of the war-of-liberation, and the ensuing civil war in the former Italian Somalia, the SSDF has had serious internal difficulties and has, as a result, been largely indecisive. This internal conflict has been mainly between

The last known Congress of the SSDF was in 1986, when they elected Dr. Hassan Ali Mireh as their Chairman. He resigned in 1988 at the end of his term of office. Without such a formal Congress, there is no official policy and it appears that the second group above has obtained control, and has selected General Mohamed Abshir Musa as their Chairman.

Until the defeat of General Barre in April 1992, members of the Manifesto Group from the SSDF allied themselves loosely with the members of the Manifesto Group from the USC, i.e. the "interim government" of Mr. Ali Mahdi, as well as with General Barre and his SNF. It has frequently fought battles against the USC militias of General 'Aidid' as well as his larger SNA (Somali National Alliance).

The SSDF now has its own de facto government for the Northern third of the former Italian Somalia, consisting of the Eastern and Nugal Regions, as well as parts of the Mudug Region. This government is headed by General Mohamed Abshir Musa.

When expanding his mandate and base of power, it was important for General 'Aidid' of the USC of the non-Darod Hawiyes to include clans from the Darod group of clans. Ruling out the SNF as the Marehan clan of General Barre left General 'Aidid' with a choice mainly between the SPM and the SSDF.

The SPM was composed primarily of Ogadenis, but also had a strong minority of Hartis – who moved in large numbers to the areas around Mogadishu and Kismayo several decades ago. When the SPM split into two subfactions, General 'Aidid' chose to cooperate first with the larger subfaction of the Ogadenis under Colonel Omar Jess, rather than the smaller subfaction composed mainly of Hartis, who were obviously closely related to the SSDF of Hartis in the North. Therefore, the SSDF has allied itself loosely with its relatives in the SPM subfaction headed by General Adan Abdullahi Nur ('Gabyow'), which is now headed militarily by General Mohamed Saeed Hirsi ('Morgan').

Since General 'Morgan' is himself a Majerteen, married to the daughter of General Barre (a Marehan), he has been trying very hard since occupying Bardera in October 1992 to woo the SSDF into more openly joining forces with him in defeating General 'Aidid'. Since the SSDF sees General 'Aidid' as a major competitor for power, they have entered into a loose informal cooperation with General 'Morgan' (and hence indirectly with the forces of General Barre). However, the SSDF has been cautious about going too far and has tried to avoid becoming involved in the fighting among other factions. Other than relatively small clashes with the militia of General 'Aidid' South of Galkayo, they have succeeded in staying out of the fighting.

Since the Majerteens were the predominant political force in Somalia during the 1960's, they also claim a right to playing a major role in any post-Barre Somalia.

The major security problem that the SSDF has had has been due to the Islamic fundamentalists who have attacked several cities and temporarily captured some smaller cities or villages. However, the SSDF has recently driven most of these fundamentalists, about 2,000, across the border into the Republic of Somaliland, where these fundamentalists captured and still hold the port city of Las Khoreh.

There is alleged involvement of these Islamic fundamentalists with Islamic fundamentalists in Eastern Ethiopia. They have carried out assassinations of UN personnel both in Bosaso and in Eastern Ethiopia. Some rumors claim that the Islamic Front for Freeing Oramo may have been supporting the Islamic fundamentalists in the SSDF territory. Although we have no concrete evidence, we suspect that the opposite is probably true – that at least logistical support for the fundamentalists has come primarily through the port of Bosaso and gone through the SSDF region into the different fundamentalist Islamic groups in Eastern Ethiopia. As another indicator, it appears that the assassination of a UN official near Gode in Ethiopia was organized and implemented from the territory of the SSDF – and not vice versa.

The territory of the SSDF suffered only limited damage during the war-of-liberation and was not involved in the fighting instigated by Mr. Ali Mahdi and his attempt to unilaterally install a new government in Mogadishu after the fall of General Barre. Therefore, the economy has been able to recover, by resuming exports of livestock through their port of Bosaso. It appears that very few reporters have visited the SSDF region in the past two years to report on the relative stability there.

For the pessimists who claim that the problems of Somalia today are inevitable, due to the alleged intrinsic Somali nature, the territory controlled by the SSDF presents an interesting counter example. If the international community had not massively supported the attempt by Mr. Ali Mahdi and his colleagues to create a new government in Mogadishu with no support from the rest of the Somalis, then the rest of the former Italian Somalia could have developed much like in the area of the SSDF – with practically no fighting and starvation. The attempt to go-it-alone by Mr. Ali Mahdi and his Abgal clan, with international support, inevitably divided the rest of Somalia and plunged Somalia into inter-clan warfare.

The Majerteens claim to be the best international lobbyists of all Somalis. They have been very effective in convincing the US State Department that no new government can succeed in Mogadishu that is not based upon the Darods, particularly themselves. They have been trying to convince the United Nations to take operational control over all of Somalia and to install a new Government – assuming that the UN would then appoint General Mohamed Abshir Musa either as President or Prime Minister and thereby allow them to return to the privileged position of power that they had earlier. They have also been particularly successful in influencing the positions of Egypt and Italy.

The Majerteens have opposed recognition for an independent Republic of Somaliland, hoping to be able to rule over the Republic of Somaliland themselves from Mogadishu. In early March 1993, they reversed this position and now privately favor recognition for the Republic of Somaliland. The reason is that they realistically fear that any new Government in Mogadishu over all of the former Somalia would more likely be an alliance between the Isaqs in the Republic of Somaliland and the non-Darod clans in the former Italian Somalia – which would squeeze them out of power. Without unification with the Republic of Somaliland, the chances are better for them to obtain a Darod-based Government in Mogadishu. They have even recently been offering the position of Prime Minister to the large and important Rahanweyn group of clans, that otherwise would not accept either a Darod or Hawiye based Government in Mogadishu.

Abdulrahman Ahmed Ali ("Tuur"), Chairman of the SNM and President of the Republic of Somaliland

The SNM was founded more-or-less simultaneously by different groups of individuals in Saudi Arabia, Mogadishu, and London. The groups in Saudi Arabia and Mogadishu sent delegates to London for making the formal proclamation of the founding of their movement in April of 1981.

The founding committee in London consisted of the following members:

• Ahmed Mohamed Gulaid ("Jimaleh") was the President of this group and became the first Chairman of the SNM,
• Hassan Adan Wadadeed (Vice President)
• Ahmed Ismael
• Mohamed Hashi Elmi
• Abdisalan
• Said

[This list is still incomplete.]

Since its founding, the SNM has had 5 democratically-elected Chairmen, as follows:

1. Ahmed Mohamed Gulaid ('Jimaleh') (Habar Awal clan),
2. Yusuf Sheikh Ali Sheikh Madar (Habar Awal clan),
3. Abdulkadir Kosar Abdi (Habar Yunis clan),
4. Ahmed Mohamed Mohamoud ('Silanyo') (Habar Jeclo clan), and
5. Abdulrahman Ahmed Ali ('Tuur') (Habar Yunis clan).

'Silanyo' served by far the longest as Chairman. The last Chairman, 'Tuur', is the current President of the Republic of Somaliland.

The SNM has been reasonably broad based, composed mainly of

• Isaq clans from the former British Somaliland,
• Dir clans from the South of the former Italian Somalia, and
• individual members from the Gadabursi group of clans, Warsangeli clan, Dhulbahante clan, and Isa group of clans in the former British Somaliland.

The highest-ranking non-Isaq member of the SNM was the Vice-Chairman under 'Silanyo', Mr. Ali Mohamed Ossoble ("Wardhigley") – is a Hawiye. As of around 1984, there were a substantial number of members in the SNM from the Dir, Hawiye, and Isaq groups of clans living in the former Italian Somalia, showing a broad geographical as well as clan base at that time.

The driving force has been the unified desire to oppose the oppressive socialist dictatorship of General Barre, rather than to support any particular clans, such as the Isaq clans that provided the largest fraction of its membership. Therefore, it collected intellectuals with a wide variety of political views who shared this common goal. There was a longer-term desire to stop the oppression from the central government in Mogadishu as well as to decentralize much of the power of that government. However, the short-term motivation of stopping the growing genocide of the Isaq group of clans by General Barre focused the goals of the SNM on a narrower clan basis.

In sharp contrast to other liberation movements at that time, the SNM did make a serious effort to use internal democratic procedures to develop political goals based upon an internal consensus – and to publish them. Following is a typical statement published in 1981:

"We propose a new political system built on Somali cultural values of co-operation rather than coercion; a system which elevates the Somali concept of 'Xeer' or inter-family social contract in which no man exercised political power over another except according to established law and custom, to the national level."

Among 11 guidelines also published at that time, the following may be of particular interest:

Rather than to try to expand further to include members from even more clans and groups of clans, it assisted the Hawiyes in forming their USC and the Ogadenis in forming their SPM as sister liberation movements in the fight to oust the socialist dictatorship of General Barre in the war-of-liberation.

In 1982, the Executive Committee of the SNM moved from London to Addis Ababa. This was prompted by oppressive actions of the dictatorship in Hargeisa in February 1992 as well as the desertions of many senior army officers to the SNM in Ethiopia.

One of the 3 parties of the Tripartite Agreement (Ethiopia, Libya, and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen) did come to the direct aid of the SNM. Namely, Yemen armed the first 500 militiamen of the SNM so that they could start operations across the border in Somalia. This enabled them to carry out spectacular raids in 1982, such as freeing over 1000 political prisoners in the Mandera Prison and freeing Colonel Abdillahi Askar and other captive SNM officials in Hargeisa just before they were to be executed in public.

In exasperation with its lack of knowledge of what the SNM was doing, at a time when Ethiopia wanted to have better control over the SNM, the Ethiopian Commander at Harar negotiated an agreement with the Commander of the SNM militia in 1984, Colonel Mohamoud Sheekh ('Shine'). The SNM agreed to give the Ethiopian Government better information about its operations and the Ethiopian Government agreed to give the SNM practically all of the logistical support that it needed.

General Barre was extremely irritated by the growing number of Hawiyes joining the SNM and the fact that the Vice Chairman was a Hawiye. He did succeed in creating a conflict between the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the SNM so that the Vice Chairman, Ali Mohamed Ossoble ('Wardhigley') finally resigned. Other foreign countries appear to have cooperated with General Barre in developing the theory that since the SSDF had stopped their armed resistance to General Barre, only the SNM was left. If the SNM could be induced to give up their armed struggle, there would be no more conflict and opposition to General Barre. Despite the various bribes offered, the SNM refused to stop in its war-of-liberation. Many other leading Hawiye members of the SNM also left the SNM in 1987 as a result of this episode.

In April 1988, Colonel Mengistu of Ethiopia struck a peace deal with General Barre, to their mutual convenience, whereby each agreed to stop supporting the liberation movements based in their countries and launching raids in the other country. The basic idea was to force the SNM to withdraw from the border, deeper into Ethiopia, from where they would not be able to launch any more raids across the border. However, with the "rug pulled out from under their feet", the SNM went in the other direction and moved its militias to within Somalia. In a surprise attack, they captured Burao and most of Hargeisa on 27 and 30 May 1988 respectively. This led to a rapid escalation in the intensity of the war-of-liberation on both sides.

It is relevant to note that during this period, the top leadership of the SSDF defected from their political base by joining forces with General Barre, while their political base continued to oppose General Barre. Nominally, the majority of the leaders of the Majerteens, Dhulbahantes, and Warsangelis (all Darods) living on both sides of the border between the Republic of Somaliland and the former Italian Somalia were on the side of General Barre. However, large numbers of individuals at the grass roots level, such as intellectuals and officers, continued to fight against General Barre, in parallel with or together with the SNM, such as by joining the SNM in 1988. This may help to explain why the vast majority of the Dhulbahante and Warsangeli residents of the Republic of Somaliland today support independence for their Republic of Somaliland, whereas very small cliques of elite leaders have cooperated with other members of the Dhulbahante and Warsangeli clans living in the South near Kismayo to form the very small USP faction that opposes independence for the Republic of Somaliland today.

The SNM and its militias did most of the fighting in the war-of-liberation against the socialist dictatorship through the 1980's. Only at the end, in the last 1 to 1 1/2 years, did it receive substantial assistance from the USC and SPM in the South.

Immediately after defeating the military forces of General Barre in January 1991, the SNM called a meeting in March 1991 of the Elders of all non-Issaq clans in the former British Somaliland to reconcile any potential differences between them and the Isaq clans – as agreed upon by all liberation movements before the end of the war-of-liberation.

The SNM then met with the Elders of the Isaq group of clans in the middle of April 1991 in Hargeisa.

Despite some embarrassing exceptions, the SNM has generally done an outstanding job in restoring respect for the human rights of minorities within its midst. Even the Human Rights Bureau of the US State Department has recognized this achievement, even though the rest of the US State Department is opposed to the SNM because of its insistence upon independence for its new secular democracy.

The SNM has evolved from a liberation movement into a political party, representing primarily the interests of the Isaq group of clans – even though a substantial number of its members and supporters are still from the non-Isaq clans in the RSL. It plays a dominate role in the current civilian democratic Government, since the Isaq people make up about 66% of the total population (see Figure A-4-11 in "Reunification"), but the Government also has important members from all major non-Isaq clans. In the first Cabinet, 4 of the 18 Ministers were from non-Isaq clans, i.e. 78% Isaq and 22% non-Isaq. The Central Committee of the SNM that was elected at their National Conference in March/April 1990 had 19 out of 90 members as non-Isaqs, i.e. 21%. To a certain extent, weakness in this Government since its inception in May 1991 reflects weakness and confusion within the SNM itself as a political party.

The militia of the SNM has also declined in importance since the war-of-liberation ended successfully. Due to a total lack of funding for the Government of the RSL, it has not been able to implement its plans to consolidate its militias into a national military force and then to systematically demobilize this national military force. Without funding to feed or pay its militiamen itself, its militia has fragmented into many smaller militias, each associated with a subclan that feeds them. Although fragmented and disorganized, these many militias do control much of the countryside of the RSL and provide general law-and-order – although they are continuing to have serious difficulties in restraining criminal gangs, such as from highway robbery.

As of 1984, many members of the Dir group of clans in both the Republic of Somaliland and the former Italian Somalia joined the SNM and fought together against the oppressive socialist dictatorship of General Barre. They were duly and democratically represented in the Conferences and Committees of the SNM.

After the declaration of independence for the Republic of Somaliland in May 1991, both the Dir and Isaq members of the SNM living in the former Italian Somalia felt left without a political platform Around March 1992, the Dir and the Isaq members of the SNM living in the former Italian Somalia broke off to form a separate SSNM (Southern Somali National Movement).

The SSNM held a re-organization congress with democratically-selected delegates from the former Italian Somalia and elected Colonel Abdi Warsame Isaaq, as their Chairman.

From the beginning, the SSNM has had close relationships with the USC, particularly the faction of General 'Aidid'. Also, many members from the Dir group of clans are integrated into the USC along with the Hawiyes as the predominant source of members for the USC.

The SSNM is one of the 4 factions in the former Italian Somalia that joined to form the SNA (Somali National Alliance) on 12 August 1992 at Bardera. Therefore, its territory is now more-or-less integrated within the SNA (consisting of the USC faction of General 'Aidid', the SPM faction of Colonel Omar Jess, the SDM faction of Colonel Mohamed Nur Aliyou, and themselves).

The militia of the SSNM has played an active role in rebuffing the repeated attempts by General Barre, the SNF, and the Harti SPM to recapture Mogadishu by military force. In particular, they fought together with other militias in the Kismayo and Gedo regions in defeating the militias of General Barre in April 1992.

The SSNM maintains headquarters at both Merca and in Mogadishu.

General Adan Abdillahi Nur ('Gabyow'), Chairman

The SPM was originally organized by the SNM (Somali National Movement) in 1988/1989, primarily as a liberation movement of the Ogaden clan within the Darod group of clans – to oppose General Barre. Their main aims were to restore democracy, justice, and national unity. The Ogadenis are particularly frustrated by their confusing identity as: a clan belonging to the Darod group of clans and with almost equally large numbers living in Kenya, Somalia, and Ethiopia.

The Ogadenis who formed and participated in the SPM were primarily those who live near Kismayo and near the border with Kenya in the South of the former Italian Somalia. However, the Ogadenis do not form a majority in Kismayo itself and they live intermingled with several other clans throughout this general region.

The main clans living in the city of Kismayo are

• Warday clan (Dir group of clans),
• Gaaljecel clan (Hawiye group of clans),
• Reer Aw-Saeed clan (Dir group of clans), and
• Sheikhal clan (Hawiye group of clans).

The first king of the Warday clan was Waamo. The 5'th and current king of the Warday clan was inaugurated in 1990 in Kismayo and his name is Bokor Mohamed. ("Bokor" is his title, meaning "King" in the Somali language and Mohamed is his given name.)

Majerteens and Ogadenis moved into Kismayo and the region around Kismayo later. The first Ogadeni to move here was Ogaas Yusuf Baaltaageul, who moved to the Afmedaw district of Kismayo in 1850. The first of the Majerteens to move to Kismayo arrived in 1911. They were followed by many more, including the intermingled Aurtoble, who were all primarily traders and businessmen.

From the beginning, the SPM coordinated their military operations closely with the USC, particularly the Chairman and Military Commander of the USC, General 'Aidid'. The SPM attacked in the Bakol and Bay Regions towards Mogadishu while General 'Aidid' and his USC attacked from further North. They also had agreements on how to reconcile differences and to establish a new democratic government for Somalia after defeating General Barre.

The militia of the SPM captured Balli-Dogle air base (100 Km West of Mogadishu) several days before General Barre fled from Mogadishu.

The SPM still opposed General Barre in January 1991, when General Barre was driven out of Mogadishu. However, the unilateral declaration of an "interim government" by Mr. Ali Mahdi, without coordination with the SPM and in violation of the agreement between the liberation movements, led immediately to a crisis.

The SPM demanded that the Manifesto Group, that had unilaterally self-proclaimed the "interim government" of Mr. Ali Mahdi, must withdraw its illegal claims. They demanded that the Manifesto Group not interfere with a reconciliation conference among all armed liberation movements who won the war-of-liberation against General Barre and the national transitional government that this conference should create.

The Manifesto Group responded by sending a delegation to the headquarters of the SPM in Afgoi offering a few cabinet ministries and other benefits in exchange for the SPM recognizing their self-proclaimed "interim government". The SPM refused to become involved in such treachery by breaking its agreements with General 'Aidid' as Chairman of the USC and with the SNM on sharing power as equals in the new national transitional government.

The Manifesto Group and their self-proclaimed "interim government" falsely claimed in Mogadishu that the SPM had switched sides and was now on the side of General Barre. This false information enraged the USC supporters in Mogadishu so that they attacked the SPM headquarters and drove the SPM Westwards. This left the SPM with no alternative, than to actually join the forces of General Barre, in self-defense from this unprovoked attack by the Manifesto Group and their self-proclaimed "interim government". This foolish and arrogant action by the Manifesto Group and their "interim government" directly started the new civil war after the end of the war-of-liberation. It also blocked the ability of General 'Aidid' to quickly pursue the military forces of General Barre in his retreat – which could have prevented the later attacks by General Barre against Mogadishu in April 1991 and April 1992 before they could have been launched.

General Barre and his supporters took quick advantage of this unexpected benefit of the SPM now reluctantly siding with them. As their "carrot", they proclaimed that the SPM would be the leader and representative of all Darod clans in the South, near the border with Kenya. To take more-permanent control over the SPM, they started to dilute its original Ogadeni membership by adding as many other Darods from this region to the SPM as possible, primarily from the Majerteen, Dhulbahante, and Warsangeli clans of the Darod group of clans. This led to fighting within the leadership of this expanded SPM, with new members and new alliances.

These events shows how clan relationships within the Darod group of clans temporarily and reluctantly overruled ideological differences with General Barre. It also shows how international support for Mr. Ali Mahdi caused a breakdown in the agreements made earlier among all major liberation movements for peaceful reconciliation after defeating General Barre. This support was very important for General Barre, since it gave him access to the port of Kismayo and part of the border with Kenya for importing new weapons and munitions through his new SPM ally rather than opponent.

2.5 SPM (Ogadeni)

The new Ogadeni SPM, or the original SPM, depending upon how you want to look at it, is much larger than the mainly non-Ogadeni remnants left over.

Since Colonel Jess maintained friendly personal contacts with General 'Aidid' during his temporary forced alignment with General Barre, he quickly started to cooperate with the main USC faction of General 'Aidid' again.

The faction of Colonel Jess joined with General 'Aidid' in creating the SNA (Somali National Alliance) on 12 August 1992 in Bardera and therefore the territory of this faction has been integrated into the government of the SNA, with its common police force. However, peace has been constantly disrupted in these regions, primarily by the continued attacks by General 'Morgan' and his combined Harti SPM and SNF militia forces.

2.6 SPM (Harti)

The original territory of the Hartis was in the Northern Third of the former Italian Somalia, from the port of Bosaso down to Galkayo, with the Warsangelis and Dhulbahantes extending over across the border into the Republic of Somaliland. Several decades ago, large numbers of members from these 3 clans moved South and settled mainly in the two regions of Mogadishu and Kismayo. There are probably more Hartis living in the South than in their original homelands now.

The Majerteens played a dominant role in national politics during the 1960's and the Dhulbahantes played very important roles in politics during the socialist dictatorship of General Barre, as a partner in the MOD Alliance. Together, they were able to use the patronage of General Barre to exercise political power over the original inhabitants of their new areas of residence in the South.

There is considerable hatred between these two factions of the SPM, since they split. The Ogadenis resent the oppressive domination over themselves by the Hartis living in their original territory during the socialist dictatorship of General Barre. This oppressive dominating role under General Barre has resulted in numerous acts of revenge by the Hawiyes in and around Mogadishu and by the Ogadenis in and around Kismayo now that the Harti are no longer in power. This has included looting and destruction of many of their houses and farms, as well as outright killings.

In January 1993, General 'Morgan' of the SPM (Harti) attacked the militia of the SPM (Ogadeni) under Colonel Jess near Kismayo with a combined SPM-SNF military force, partly as revenge for the defection of Colonel Jess and partly as revenge for attacks upon Harti civilians in the area under the control of Colonel Jess. Since the US-led military forces of UNITAF blocked the offensive of the SPM (Harti) and SNF against Baidoa in December 1992, this military force, under the command of General 'Morgan', moved South towards Kismayo and closer to their safe sanctuaries across the border in Kenya.

• SPM (Harti) faction of the Majerteens, Warsangelis, and Dhulbahantes;
• SSDF faction of the Majerteens; and
• USP faction of the Warsangelis and Dhulbahantes.

In addition, two non-Harti Darod clans also have liberation movements of their own;

• SNF faction of the Marehan clan and
• SPM (Ogadeni) faction of Ogadenis, thereby giving the single Darod group of clans a total of 5 out of 15 votes at the UN Conferences in Addis Ababa.

This demonstrates how the Majerteens are succeeding in their goal of assuring that any new government in Mogadishu will be based upon the Darod group of clans. The Darod group of clans now has 33.3% of the votes, even though they only have about 20% of the population in the former Italian Somalia or about 15% of the population in the former Somalia (including the Republic of Somaliland). Including the notoriety generated by General Barre for his Marehan clan and the MOD Alliance for the Marehan, Ogadeni, and Dhulbahante clans -- together with promotion by the Majerteen clan -- the Darods are certainly the group of clans most talked about.

2.8 United Somali Congress (USC)

Prior to January 1991

Armed resistance from members of the Hawiye group of clans to the oppressive socialist dictatorship of General Barre began early -- long before the USC itself was founded. Hawiye guerrilla fighters from the Saleban subclan of the Habar Gedir clan fought together with the SSDF militia forces from 1983 until 1986 -- when they were left stranded as the SSDF changed political courses.

The first pure Hawiye militia unit was formed at Balli Dhuumoodle (between Galkayo and the Ethiopian border) in 1988, mainly by members of the Saad subclan of the Habar Gedir Clan. However, the guerrilla fighters from the Saleban subclan joined them, as well as many Hawiye defectors from the military forces of General Barre.

General Barre launched many attacks and atrocities against the people in the vicinity of this base in an unsuccessful attempt to crush it.

Hawiye activists came to the conclusion that they needed to have a liberation movement of their own in late 1988. Activists with similar views from Somalia, the Emirates, Europe, and North America traveled to Rome, Italy, during January 1989 to form their own liberation movement, the USC (United Somali Congress).

The USC was first legally registered in Rome on 1 February 1989¹⁵, by

• Hussein Ahmed Mohamed,
• Abdi Hilowle Hassan,
• Hassan Mohamud Moheddin, and
• Hassan Omar Mohamed.

The driving force in creating the USC in Rome was Dr. Omar M. Hassan, who had lived in Rome for over 30 years.

The people who founded the USC in Rome may have been united about the need for a Hawiye political organization, but they were not united on the policies that the new USC should follow. In particular, some of these leaders, such as those from the Manifesto Group, wanted to cooperate with General Barre and to share power with him -- rather than to launch military attacks against the forces of General Barre in an attempt to depose him.

However, the majority at this convening meeting prevailed with a policy of using force to evict General Barre and they elected a Chairman and 3 Vice Chairmen to lead their organization towards this goal. This first Chairman was Mr. Ali Wardhigley, who had previously resigned as Vice Chairman of the SNM (as the highest-ranking non-Isaq leader in the SNM).

Yet, this new USC in Rome developed no strategic plans or concepts for any concrete actions towards achieving their abstract goal. This lack of practical leadership and assistance was particularly frustrating for the Hawiye militiamen already fighting from their base at Balli Dhuumoodle.

Just the news of the formation of the USC as a political organization of the Hawiye group of clans did have some practical effects of mobilizing Hawiye people to individual actions. It also provided the basis for a large demonstration in Mogadishu on 14 July 1989 against the Dictatorship of General Barre. Similar demonstrations and mutinies from the armed forces occurred across the territory occupied by the Hawiye group of clans.

Dr. Ismael Jimaale founded the USC section in Mogadishu shortly afterwards. He was the Chairman of the Hawiye Elders and Chairman of the 114-man Manifesto Group at that time. He was a member of the Abgal Clan of the Hawiye group of clans and was a prominent lawyer in Mogadishu.

Dr. Jimaale requested General Mohamed Farah Hassan ('Aidid'), who was the Somali Ambassador to India at that time, to join the USC and lead its military forces. General 'Aidid' defected from the Government of General Barre and accepted this offer.

After one year of internal fighting within the nominal headquarters General 'Aidid' called a Re-organization Congress of the USC at Mustahil, on the Shebelle River, just across the border from Belet Huen into Ethiopia, in May/June 1990. The following groups were active at this Congress, representing different constituencies:

• a delegation from the Hawiye exiles living abroad,
• the Leading Committee of the SNM Southern Front,
• a delegation from the fighting group at Balli Dhuumoodle base,
• a delegation of representatives from the fighting group at the Hanan-Weilood base,
• guerrillas from Galgadud Region and Mogadishu, and
• other activists.

This Congress elected General 'Aidid' as the new Chairman of the USC -- not without some dissent among the delegates. One of the objectives was to replace the nominal headquarters in distant Rome, run by theorists a long way away from the battlefield, with a realistic headquarters next to the battlefield that could provide pragmatic support for the USC militias that were actually fighting in the war-of- liberation.

During the war-of-liberation, there were at least three competing seats of political power within the USC,

1. a political and military center around General 'Aidid', under the mandate of Dr. Jimaale, operating first in Ethiopia and gradually in the countryside of the former Italian Somalia -- mainly in areas inhabited by the Hawiyes.
2. a political center in Mogadishu consisting of the main founders of the USC, and
3. a political center in Rome consisting of mainly of Hawiye expatriates living abroad.

The USC militia under General 'Aidid' generated the military pressure upon General Mohamed Siad Barre, in parallel to the pressure being applied by the SNM in the distant North, that played the key role in driving General Barre out of Mogadishu at the end of January 1991. However, there was a mass uprising of all citizens in Mogadishu in December 1990 / January 1992 against General Barre, including a small militia of the USC Mogadishu section, that put the final touches upon the hasty defeat of General Barre from Mogadishu.

The complex events that followed, with a small group in Mogadishu creating an "interim government" headed by Mr. Mohamed Ali Mahdi as "interim president", started the degeneration of order within the USC that in turn led to the new civil war among different factions in the former Italian Somalia. This process is so important for understanding the resulting problems in the former Italian Somalia that it will be presented in more detail in a separate Chapter. [The incomplete draft, which attempts to document the respective mandates that General 'Aidid' and Mr. Mohamed Ali Mahdi had at different times during their mutual conflict, has not yet been cleared for release.]

2.9 United Somali Congress (USC) ('Aidid' -- SNA)

General Mohamed Farah Hassan ('Aidid'), Chairman

After January 1991

This is the larger and more powerful faction of the disorganized and fragmented USC.

On 12 August 1992, 4 factions, including the USC faction of General 'Aidid' met in Bardera and formed the SNA (Somali National Alliance). Together, they control a major central part of the former Italian Somalia, from the Kenyan border nearly up to Galkayo. They are working on a common constitution, creating a "national police force" with a planned strength of 6,000 men, and a common integrated governmental structure. Progress has been slowed primarily by the unexpected invasion by General Barre's army under General Mohamed Saeed Hirsi ('Morgan'), that captured Bardera in the middle of their territory at the beginning of October 1992, as well as the continued lack of cash to make their new government work effectively (the same problem as in the RSL).

2.10 United Somali Congress (USC) (Mahdi)

Mr. Mohamed Qanyare Afrah, Chairman

This is the smaller faction of the USC, sometimes called the self-proclaimed "interim government" of "interim President" Mr. Mohamed Ali Mahdi.

After the fighting between the factions of Gen. 'Aidid' and Mr. Mohamed Ali Mahdi broke out again in November 1991, Mr. Mohamed Ali Mahdi called a small conference of his followers, which he called the Central Committee of the USC, on 27-30 January 1992. They removed Gen. 'Aidid' at this meeting as Chairman and replaced him with Mr. Mohamed Qanyare Afrah as Chairman, who is a local businessman from Mogadishu.

Mr. Mohamed Qanyare belongs to the Murasade clan. They had just defected from their neutral status to join Mr. Mohamed Ali Mahdi at that time, because of a diplomatic blunder by Ass. Sec. Gen. James Jonah of the United Nations during his visit on 3-5 January 1992. The Murasade were waiting at the airport, which they controlled, to receive Jonah and to offer their services to the UN in mediating and stopping the fighting. However, Jonah was so poorly prepared for the trip that he apparently didn't know of the existence of the neutral Murasade clan (member of the Hawiye group of clans) and neutral Hawadle clan (not a member of the Hawiye group of clans) and snubbed them, which prompted the Murasade to give up their neutrality and join Mr. Mohamed Ali Mahdi. (This blunder eliminated the best possibility at that time for immediately stopping the fighting in Mogadishu.)¹⁶

Both the Murasade clan of the Hawiye group of clans and the Abgal clan of the Hawiye group of clans have large numbers of members residing in Mogadishu but their main areas are in a 60 x 360 km strip parallel to the coast North of Mogadishu, up to Harardera. Since their two territories are adjacent in this strip, they are natural neighbors and allies. Their total combined territory is about 3.4% of the territory of the former Republic of Somalia.

(Gen. 'Aidid' and the rest of the USC did not recognize the validity of this "conference" or its results.)

2.11 Somali Democratic Movement (SDM)

Mr. Abdi Muse Mayo, Chairman of pro-Mahdi faction

Colonel Mohamed Nur Aliyou, Chairman of pro-'Aidid' faction

Prior to January 1991

The SDM was founded by Mr. Abdulkadir Mohamed Adan ('Zobo = "lame in one leg"). He served as Minister of Finance and Minister of Interior during the democracy in the 1960's. He has developed good relationships with Mr. Mohamed Ali Mahdi, the Majerteens and their SSDF, as well as other clans in the former Italian Somalia. He is still active in the SDM, despite his age.

The SDM is based primarily upon the large Rahanweyn group of 17 clans and possibly other clans of the Saab group of clans. (They are sometimes referred to as the Dig and Midhifle.) They have a different clan structure than the rest of the Somali clans and may not derive from Arab settlers. They live primarily as farmers between the two rivers (Shebelle and Juba), particularly around Baidoa. They are one of the largest and most significant groups of Somalis in the former Italian Somalia.

The SDM announced its formation in both Dubai and Rome in mid 1989. They proposed a platform of decentralization of power and proposed to protect the interests of the settlers between the two rivers -- who had not received fair treatment under previous governments. Although they claimed that they intended to fight actively against General Barre during the war-of-liberation, they had internal organizational problems and never actually fielded a militia during this period. However, many individuals from the SDM did fight, either as individuals or together with the USC and original Ogadeni SPM against General Barre.¹⁷

After January 1991

At the end of 1991, the SDM re-organized itself in order to be able to defend its interests better in the chaos that was evolving in the former Italian Somalia. At this time, they elected a new Chairman, Colonel Mohamed Nur Alio. They broke with the old political alliances of Mr. Abdulkadir Mohamed Adan ("Zobo") and formed an effective militia of their own. They have formed new alliances, particularly with the USC faction of General 'Aidid'. They are also one of the 4 charter members of the SNA (Somali National Alliance) headed by General 'Aidid' and their militia has participated as a full member of the SLA (Somali Liberation Army) of the SNA. They have their offices in Baidoa and Mogadishu.

A smaller splinter faction evolved under Mr. Abdi Muse Mayo. They maintained the old alliances and policies established earlier under Abdulkadir Mohamed Adan.

The SDM opposed General Barre and effectively divided the territory of the Marehan clan of General Barre into two separate territories after Gen. Mohamed Siad Barre fled from Mogadishu at the end of January 1991. General Barre recaptured Baidoa in the Summer of 1991 and used it as his personal residence and main base of operations -- in the middle of Rahanweyn territory, in order to be centrally located between his two main Marehan areas. His military controlled both the city and the airport. However, it appears that the SDM continued to control most of the countryside, including up to the border with Ethiopia.

In this context, the "21st Committee"