| 1. |
General:
A key characteristic of an unstable escalating Richardson's Process is
the misperception of both parties that they are only reacting
defensively to provocative actions by the other party that they
themselves did not provoke. (This is, of course, a logical
contradiction.) Therefore, each side insists upon its "right"
for the last "retaliation". This is like a personal argument,
where each person insists upon having the last word. Such a spiraling
conflict can only end when one party shows sufficient restraint not to
react to the last provocative action of the other party. (Are either the
Israelis or the Palestinians willing to not react to the last aggression
towards them?) Such escalations of a conflict in a Richardson's Process
usually end only by
 |
changing the false perceptions
of both parties that cause them to escalate rather than de-escalate
the conflict, |
|
an outside peacemaking
military intervention that arbitrarily resolves the political issues
and imposes peace, or |
|
continuing on to open warfare,
where one party defeats the other party and imposes its will upon
that party. |
|
| 2. |
General:
These misperceptions deflect focus
| from the
reality, that a large number of escalations back-and-forth have
occurred; |
| to the illusion, that the conflict is mainly
concerned with the last actions of each party. |
The supporters of each side adopt the same
biased misperceptions of the conflict as their clients. Outside parties
who have adopted the biased perceptions of one party can not negotiate
peace successfully between the two principal parties.
|
| 3. |
The goal of a ceasefire as a
pre-requisite to negotiations is not realistic. Israel can agree to and
implement a ceasefire, because violence by Israel is centrally
controlled through their military and police forces. The Palestinian
Authority could agree to a ceasefire, but could not implement a
ceasefire, because violence by Palestinians is not centrally controlled
by the Palestinian Authority but rather by small ad hoc groups of
people who will insist upon having the last word through retaliation
against Israel. When Israel kills, captures, and/or punishes members of
these ad hoc groups, these groups will insist upon revenge --
independent of what the Palestinian Authority wants them to do.
|
| 4. |
A political settlement of the issues
must be achieved first, as a prerequisite to a ceasefire, because a
genuine ceasefire is only feasible once the key political issues have
been resolved. But, in a classical "chicken and the egg"
paradox, both parties refuse to negotiate before there is a ceasefire
(after they have retaliated to the last action by their opponent).
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| 5. |
As a result of the two conditions above, the Israelis and
Palestinians are no longer in a position to solve the logical impasse
themselves. It can only be solved quickly, before the situation
escalates into an even more dangerous international conflict, through an
external intervention that
| imposes a political settlement first; then |
| creates a ceasefire based upon this political settlement;
and |
| finally allows negotiations to fine-tune the political settlement
without either party being able to "blackmail' the other party. |
|
| 6. |
The legal justification for such a radical solution by the
International Community lies in Chapter VII and Article 42 therein of
the Charter of the United Nations, after the UN Security Council has
determined that the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians has
become a threat to international peace and has given an appropriate
mandate to a group of neutral Members of the United Nations to serve as
peacemakers..
|
| 7. |
The international intervention should have three political
guidelines:
- Resolution 242 of the UN Security Council as providing a
reasonable basis for an external resolution of the conflict,
including the demarcation of all borders and the removal of all
illegal Israeli settlements in both the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip.
- Immediate international recognition of the State of Palestine
within the borders defined indirectly by Resolution 242.
- The current proposal from Saudi Arabia should be integrated to
provide peace between the Arab/Islamic World with Israel as well as
to provide a substantial amount of funding for reconstruction in
Palestine that will be necessary for creating a viable State of
Palestine.
|
| 8. |
This immediate political settlement will establish the
basis for both a ceasefire and bilateral negotiations, to include both
| swapping of parcels of land to better fit the current demographic
distribution of Jews and Palestinians in this area and |
| fair allocations of the limited water resources. |
|
| 9. |
Both the Israelis hate and distrust Chairman Yasir Arafat
so intensely and the Palestinians hate and distrust Gen. Ariel Sharon so
intensely, that it appears unlikely that meaningful negotiations, even
through intermediaries, will be possible. This implies that constructive
negotiations between Israel and Palestine will probably need to be
deferred until both countries have selected new leaders untainted by the
recent escalation within the framework of a Richardson's Process. The
interim political settlement, imposed by the International Community
upon the two parties must hold until this requirement has been met.
|
| 10. |
Israel should be obliged to accept both the legal right of
the Palestinian refugees to return to their homes as well as a legal
responsibility for financial compensation to both
| these refugees for their personal losses and suffering and |
| the International Community for their costs in operating these
refugee camps and resettlement efforts. |
However, Israel should be allowed to offer additional compensation to
the refugees as an incentive, should they choose to resettle in the
State of Palestine rather than Israel. Israel should also be obliged to
compensate the State of Palestine for all damages caused by their
military incursions into the territory of Palestine, such as the
destruction of buildings and infrastructure, including in particular
that which was financed by grants from the International Community.
Likewise, the State of Palestine should be obliged to compensate the
State of Israel for all damages caused by their citizens to the
buildings and infrastructure of Israel.
|
| 11. |
The UN Compensation Commission for Iraq can be used
constructively as a model for a powerful deterrent to further acts of
aggression between the two parties. The State of Palestine could be
required to pay 100,000 USD to the Israeli Government for each Israeli
citizen killed after 28 September 2000 by Palestinians and likewise, the
State of Israel could be required to pay 100,000 USD to the Palestinian
Government for each Palestinian citizen killed by Israelis after 28
September 2000. These sums could be doubled for the period after the
ceasefire, imposed by the peacemaking force of the International
Community, for a period of 10 years.
|
| 12. |
The settlement of the major grievances of the Palestinians
restores justice to their cause and provides the basis for all ad hoc
groups to stop launching "terrorist attacks" on Israeli
citizens in Israel. In addition, the International Community should
earmark substantial funding for restoring the infrastructure and economy
of Palestine, with a provision that the amount of this aid will be
reduced by a fixed sum for every Israeli citizen killed by Palestinians
after peace has been installed -- which would create a negative
incentive for continued "terrorist attacks", since they would
ultimately hurt the interests of the Palestinians more than the
Israelis. Likewise, foreign aid to Israel should be decreased by the
same sum for every Palestinian killed by Israelis after peace has been
installed.
|
| 13. |
It violates the principles of international law to
withhold international recognition of Palestine for political reasons.
In particular, Israel wants to use political recognition as a form of
blackmail against the Palestinians, by forcing the Palestinians to cede
part of the territory legally due to the Palestinians under
international law to Israel, as a precondition for international
recognition of Palestine. The Palestinians have an unconditional right
to recognition that can not be made conditional upon them agreeing to a
further encroachment into their territory by Israel. The International
Court of Justice could be asked for a binding legal opinion on this
issue.
|
| 14. |
It is a grave error by the International Community that
the State of Palestine was not recognized at least promptly after the
date when the State of Israel was recognized. In this case, the
continuous conflict since 1948 could have been avoided. Under this
interpretation, the Palestinians arrested recently in Palestine by
Israelis should be treated as prisoners of war with protection as
defined under the Geneva Conventions -- since they were defending their
nation, recognized or not, from encroachment and invasion by Israeli
armed forces. Perhaps the UN Security Council could grant this
protection to the Palestinian prisoners of Israel retroactively -- to
discourage punishment by Israel of these individuals, which would only
make them martyrs in Palestine and re-escalate the conflict.
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| 15. |
A substantial amount of economic aid will be required to
raise the economy of the State of Palestine to approximately that of the
State of Israel. Economic parity, job opportunities, and
standards-of-living are the foundations for long-term peace in this
region.
|
| 16. |
The Israelis could have struck a much more favorable
bargain with the Palestinians if they had followed the wise
statesmanship of Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin, who was successfully
de-escalating the previous unstable Richardson's Process, together with
the active support of Chairman Yasir Arafat, back to stable manageable
levels where bilateral negotiations were feasible. (Their joint efforts
towards peace were recognized by the Nobel Peace Awards granted to both
of them, including also the Israeli Foreign Minister, Shimon Peres, at
that time. All parties need to get back onto that track towards peace.)
The Israelis should have taken this golden opportunity to cement the fait
accompli they had already achieved, rather than to risk it by trying
to take even more territory from the Palestinians. They must bear the
responsibility for their own decisions in favor of returning to an
escalation of a Richardson's Process that has led to the current
situation from which they are unwilling to "back down".
|